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JUVENILE NEUROLAW: WHEN IT'S
GOOD IT IS VERY GOOD INDEED,
AND WHEN IT'S BAD IT'S HORRID
ABIGAIL A. BAIRD*
CHRISTY L. BARROW**
MOLLY K. RICHARD***
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2006 case before the Supreme Court, a Brief Amici Curiae referenced
evidence from neuroscience to argue that adolescents lack the maturity to make
decisions about their reproductive health care.' The case, Ayotte v. Planned
Parenthood,2 began in 2003 when Planned Parenthood of Northern New England
filed a complaint against the recently passed New Hampshire Parental Notification
Prior to Abortion Act,3 which stated that minors must inform their parents before a
pregnancy may be terminated.4 Planned Parenthood won the case and the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire declared the law
unconstitutionally narrow; 5 a decision that the United States Court of Appeals for
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1. See Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006)
(No. 04-1144); see also Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 326-27 (2006)
(quoting Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (stating that minors'
"immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes impair their ability to exercise their
rights wisely").
2. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
3. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 296 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62 (D.N.H. 2003), aff'd, 390
F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 544 U.S.
1048 (2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
4. Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 132:24-132:28
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (repealed 2007).
5. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 296 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68.
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the First Circuit supported. 6 Ayotte appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the
United States.7 The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops and the Roman
Catholic Bishop of Manchester submitted a Brief Amici Curiae in support of
Ayotte, and in an attempt to show that it is necessary for adolescent females to
consult with their parents before getting an abortion, the Brief discussed as
precedent the "comparative immaturity" of juveniles cited in Roper v. Simmons:5
Parental involvement is critical to ensure not only that the adolescent's
choice is informed, but that it is freely made and not the result of
coercion or duress. . . . These concerns are heightened for adolescents
who, as this Court has recently observed, are more susceptible than
adults to "outside pressure" and other "negative influences," and more
likely than adults to make decisions that are "impetuous and ill-
considered."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court declared that the law was unconstitutional
when applied to the select few adolescents whose health could be harmed if
prevented from having an abortion and required that, to be recognized as
constitutional, the law must be broadened to include access to abortion without
parental notification in the case of medical necessity. 1 In 2007, before the United
States District Court for the District of New Hampshire could make a decision as to
whether the law should be amended or struck down entirely, the New Hampshire
state legislature repealed the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act.I
Despite the fact that the law never went into effect, this case marked the
beginning of a potential wave of legislation aimed at restricting juveniles' already
limited rights to direct their own health care.12 Using Roper v. Simmons to argue
anything about juveniles' ability to make reasonable health care decisions is akin to
comparing apples and elephants-it is absurd. What these issues do have in
6. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng. v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53, 65 (1st Cir. 2004), cert. granted sub
nom. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 544 U.S. 1048 (2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 320
(2006).
7. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 544 U.S. 1048 (2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 320
(2006).
8. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
9. Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (No. 04-1144) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
10. See Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 327-28.
I1. H.R. 184, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2007) (enacted) (repealing the parental notification law).
See Pam Belluck, New Hampshire to Repeal Parental Notification Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2007, at
A22.
12. See Belluck, supra note II (observing that after the New Hampshire parental notification
requirement was repealed, opponents of the repeal pledged to "push for a notification law when the
legislature reconvenes").
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common, however, is the use of evidence from developmental neuroscience.' 3 The
verdict in Roper v. Simmons was among the first cases where the Supreme Court
considered evidence from neuroscience in making its decision about the relative
maturity and culpability ofjuveniles who have committed violent crimes.14
Roper v. Simmons has been referred to as the "Brown v. Board of Education
of Neurolaw."' 5 It has set the precedent for courts and policy-makers to accept and
consider neuroscience even in the most prominent and controversial cases.' 6 Is this
in the best interest of the law? In this essay, we will address this question by
demonstrating that Roper v. Simmons is not an applicable precedent based on the
history of parental consent laws.' 7 We will further argue that the use of
neuroscience in the courtroom must be done in a principled manner-keeping in
mind that neuroscience cannot tell us much about individual people.' 8 We will
present instances where Neurolaw provides accurate and insightful information that
should inform legal policy, but will also provide a strong cautionary note about
using findings from neuroscience in ways that do not reflect the actual science and
only serve to make the court unnecessarily skeptical of Neurolaw in general.19
There are few better examples of this misuse than applying neuroscience to the law
when it comes to a young woman's ability to make decisions about her own health
care.20
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PARENTAL CONSENT LAWS
In the 1973 case Roe v. Wade,21 the Supreme Court affirmed the right to an
abortion for all women regardless of age.2 2 However, since this time, the Court has
13. Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (No. 04-1144) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) to argue that adolescents
lack mature decision-making capabilities).
14. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. See also Jeffrey Rosen, The Brain on the Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 49 (discussing the importance of Roper to neurolaw).
15. Rosen, supra note 14.
16. See id. (explaining that Roper had such a vast impact on neurolaw because it raised the question
"of where to draw the line in considering neuroscience evidence as a legal mitigation or excuse"); see
also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (relying on the neuroscience studies used in Roper
to abolish life without parole for non-homicidal offenses committed by juveniles); Terry Maroney, The
False Promise ofAdolescent Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89, 167 (2009)
(discussing how policy-makers can use neuroscience in developing laws "because neuroscience
generally corroborates the beliefs traditionally undergirding" the juvenile justice system).
17. See infra Part 11-111.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part V-VI.
20. See infra Part V; see, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-21-33 (LexisNexis 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-
11 (2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-4 (LexisNexis 1993) (requiring parental consent or notification
before performing an abortion on a minor).
21. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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continually allowed states to restrict the ability of women under the age of eighteen
to exert this right.23 Massachusetts was among the first to enact a law requiring
parental consent for unmarried minors seeking abortions. 24 Parents' Aid Society (an
abortion counseling group), four unnamed pregnant minor women, and William R.
Baird filed a class action challenging the statute as violating the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 After a complicated
procedural history that saw the Massachusetts law repeatedly defeated in federal
courts, 26 the State of Massachusetts petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. 27
The Supreme Court granted cert and held, consistent with its earlier decision in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,2 that the statute was
unconstitutional because it created an "absolute parental veto" over the decision of
any minor to terminate a pregnancy. 29 The Supreme Court reasoned that "neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone" and instead it
applies to all people.30 Yet it balanced this recognition against three countervailing
factors: children are unable to "make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner"; parents' roles in directing the upbringing of their own children; and "the
peculiar vulnerability of children" themselves.3' After denying the constitutionality
of the Massachusetts consent law, the Court suggested a new provision aimed at
balancing these three considerations. 32 The provision recognized state and parental
interests in guiding potentially vulnerable minors by permitting states to require
parental consent for juvenile terminations.33 It also required states with parental
22. Id at 164-65. The Court balanced a woman's right with the state's interest in the health of the
mother and the potential human life. In doing so, the Court permits the state to restrict the woman's right
to an abortion in later trimesters. Id.
23. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 841 (1992) (upholding the parental
consent requirement for minors seeking abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991)
(upholding Title X of the Public Health Service Act, Pub. L. 91-572, 84 Stat. 1506 (1970) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (2006), which prohibits the allocation of federal funds to family
planning "programs where abortion is a method of family planning"); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota,
497 U.S. 417 (1990) (plurality opinion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Baird 11) (reconsidering
Baird I after the Supreme Court remanded the case in 1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976)
(Baird 1); Baird v. Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847 (D. Mass. 1975), vacated by, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
24. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § IS (West 2003) (explaining that women under eighteen
years of age who want to have an abortion must either obtain parental consent or prove to a judge that an
abortion is in her best interest) (originally codified at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § IP).
25. Baird, 428 U.S. at 132.
26. Id. at 1006. See also Baird v. Bellotti, 450 F. Supp. 997 (1978) (reconsidering the case on
remand from the Supreme Court and reaffirming its decision that the statute is unconstitutional).
27. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622, 633 (1979) (Baird II).
28. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
29. Baird II, 443 U.S. at 639-40.
30. Id. at 633 (citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967)).
31. Id. at 634-37.
32. See id. at 643 (requiring that states "provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for
the abortion can be obtained" without parental consent).
33. Id.
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consent laws to provide a judicial bypass to parental consent under certain
conditions. 34
In addition, in the 1990 Supreme Court case Hodgson v. Minnesota,
gynecologist Dr. Jane Hodgson and another doctor asserted that a Minnesota law,
which prohibited a minor from terminating her pregnancy unless both parents were
informed, violated the Minnesota and U.S. constitutions. 35 After some deliberation,
the Supreme Court deemed the law constitutional only when it included the judicial
bypass. 36 The judicial bypass stated that if a minor proved to be mature and able to
give informed consent, or if the termination of a pregnancy without parental
notification was in the minor's best interest, a judge could ratify the minor's
request for abortion.37 The Court's decision was informed by evidence that the
American Psychological Association presented, which maintained that minors
should not be required to notify their parents in order to terminate a pregnancy,
because adolescent females are mature enough to make the decision on their own.38
In addition, the American Academy of Pediatrics et al. submitted evidence
explaining how the parental notification laws often do more harm than good by
delaying adolescents from seeking access to "necessary medical care."39
Supporters of parental involvement laws accept that some minors are not able
to seek help from their parents because of potential abuse, conflict, or inability to
contact them; and they argue that the judicial bypass option gives these minors a
fair alternative. 40 Unfortunately, this compromise for a judicial bypass has proven
unsatisfactory. Helena Silverstein, who conducted an in-depth survey of courts in
Alabama, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee, sums up her distressing findings about the
consequences of the so-called compromise:
[I]n many cases court personnel charged with implementing the
bypass option are simply unaware that it exists. Occasionally they are
not merely unaware of their responsibility to handle bypass requests
but convinced that they have no such responsibility. Even where
courts are aware of their responsibility, administrative difficulties
34. Id. The Court noted that the judicial bypass should be available for a minor who demonstrates
that she is mature enough to make the decision, or that the abortion is in her best interest. Id.
35. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 429 (1990) (plurality opinion).
36. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. Id at 427 (majority opinion).
38. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees & Cross-
Appellants at 6-10, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (No. 86-5423-MN/No. 86-5431-MN)
("[B]y mid-adolescence (14-15) the great majority of adolescents of average intelligence do not differ
from adults in their capacities to understand and reason about medical and psychological treatment
alternatives...").
39. See Brief from American Academy of Pediatrics et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees &
Cross Respondents at 13, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-805 and 88-1309).
40. Comm. on Adolescence, The Adolescent's Right to Confidential Care When Considering
Abortion, 97 PEDIATRICS 746, 749 (1996).
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often get in the way of implementation. Knowledgeable parties are
often unreachable for hours, days, and sometimes even weeks.
Political and religious views also breed implementation peculiarities,
with some judges refusing to hear bypass petitions, others candidly
stating that they will deny such petitions, and still others engaging in
practices during hearings that aggressively aim to persuade young
women to forgo abortions. 41
Parental involvement laws are constitutional so long as they do not present an
"undue burden" on women's ability to exercise their rights. 42 As discussed above,
in practice, the judicial bypass option does not meet this criterion. 43 Girls face
humiliation, are forced to testify about their sex lives, put themselves at risk of
public exposure, and are subject to an added delay that puts their health at risk.44
More recently, those seeking to increase the scope of parental notification
laws, such as Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, have attempted to indirectly introduce
neuroscientific evidence supporting the idea that juveniles are not capable of
making autonomous decisions about their health care. 45 As described in the
following section, this "precedent setting" evidence comes from the Supreme
Court's decision to ban the execution of juveniles for violent crimes committed
under the age of eighteen. 46 There are a number of factors that make this an
inappropriate precedent. These are described in the sections that follow.
41. HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: How COURTS FAIL PREGNANT MINORS 17
(2007). One of the commonplace practices employed to persuade minors to forgo abortion is mandating
pro-life counseling with crisis pregnancy centers before a bypass will be granted. Id. at 100. In these
sessions, girls are not only counseled about their options, but are told about Jesus, read Bible scriptures,
hear testimony about being saved, and are asked about their personal relationship with God. Id. at 108-
09. One director of a center explained how they ask women to watch a video that graphically "depicts
the abortion procedure." Id. at 11l. Silverstein reflected on these circumstances, and stated "[B]eing
mature does not mean being invulnerable, and only the most tenacious minor is likely to emerge
unscathed from a bypass process that is coupled with the counseling of the type described ..... Id. at
113. Even if all of the girls seeking bypasses succeed, that does not mean they have not been harmed.
42. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992).
43. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 41, at 100, 113 (describing the burdens judges place on minors
seeking the judicial bypass exception to the parental consent requirement); see also Carol Sanger,
Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, I 8 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 409, 437-56 (2009) (explaining that minors are banned by the judicial bypass process in various
ways); Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
1003, 1022 (1993) (explaining Justice Steven's opinion in Casey, where he expressed his belief that the
judicial bypass option did not save the parental consent requirement from being unduly burdensome for
the minor).
44. Sanger, supra note 43, at 444-45.
45. Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (No. 04-1144) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
46. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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III. CAN ROPER V. SIMMONS TELL Us ANYTHING ABOUT THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE?
A. Examining the Precedent: Roper v. Simmons
In the 2005 case Roper v. Simmons, Christopher Simmons faced the death
penalty for the murder of Shirley Cook, which he committed in 1993 at the age of
seventeen. 47 In a landmark decision of the same year, the Supreme Court decided to
change the age that individuals could by executed for capital crimes from sixteen to
eighteen, thereby abolishing the juvenile death penalty and commuting Simmons'
sentence from the death penalty to life in prison without the possibility of parole. 48
The Court held that executing adolescent offenders violated the Eighth
Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" clause.49 The Court reasoned that
adolescents have a harder time controlling their impulses, are more susceptible to
peer influence, and do not yet have a fully formed identity.50 In other words, the
developmental stage of adolescence mitigates the responsibility of those under the
age of eighteen, and executing such offenders goes against "the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."5'
The Supreme Court's decision, to hold unconstitutional the execution of
offenders who were minors when they committed their crimes, was influenced by
evidence from neuroscience. 52 In making their decision, the Court referred to
amicus briefs from, among others, the American Psychological Association (APA)
and American Medical Association.s3 Both organizations supported Simmons, and
utilized, in part, studies on the adolescent brain.54 They argued that the adolescent
brain is not yet wired like that of an adult, and as a result, adolescents should be
held less responsible for their actions than mature adults.55
This research illustrated that the human brain is still maturing during
adolescence and into the third decade of life. 56 Relying in part on this evidence to
47. See State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169, 191 (Mo. 1997), cert granted sub nom. Roper v.
Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160 (2004), affd, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
48. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
49. Id. at 608-09.
50. Id. at 569-70.
51. See id at 560-61 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion))
(defining "cruel and unusual" as neither precise nor static, but in alignment with changes of society).
52. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70.
53. See id. at 596, 617-18 (mentioning the amicus briefs which argued that adolescents lack the
ability to "take moral responsibility for their decisions").
54. See Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 4-5, 30, Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633); see also Brief
for American Medical Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, 5-6, Roper v. Simons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633).
55. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n, supra note 54, at 4;
Brief for American Medical Ass'n et al, supra note 54, at 4-5.
56. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (accepting that "[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable among the
young") (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); see also Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain
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support the idea that adolescents are less mature than adults, the Court sided with
the respondent, Simmons, and abolished the juvenile death penalty.57 It is
noteworthy that the Court's consideration of neuroscientific evidence was only one
factor in their decision, and in fact a relatively minor one.58 The importance of the
role of neuroscience in this decision should not be exaggerated simply to support
restrictions on adolescents' exercise of their civil rights.
B. Applying Roper v. Simmons to Health Care Decision Making
While the conclusions about the character and maturity of adolescents might
have been warranted in Roper v. Simmons, they are virtually irrelevant to
ascertaining a juvenile's ability to make autonomous health care decisions. As the
country continues to argue about women's reproductive rights and services,
juvenile girls' autonomy will be a major health care issue. As demonstrated in
Hodgson v. Minnesota and Roper v. Simmons, courts have already considered new
research in developmental science,59 and it is not surprising that such research has
been used in the discussion of adolescent girls' decision-making skills, such as in
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood.60 At the forefront of these new discoveries are
insights into the developing adolescent brain. That said, the neuroscientific data
submitted to the court in Roper v. Simmons are simply not relevant to the
discussion of minors' ability to make autonomous decisions about their health
care.6' As this section discusses, there is a clear distinction between committing a
crime and making a health care choice.
Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE
NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999) (using pediatric neuroimaging to identify changes in gray and white
matter in children and youth); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain
Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 859, 859 (1999) (studying spatial
and temporal brain mapping in adolescents and young adults); see generally Nitin Gogtay et al.,
Dynamic Mapping of Human Cortical Development During Childhood Through Early Adulthood, 101
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. 8174 (2004).
57. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70, 574-75.
58. Id. at 569-71 (discussing evidence which demonstrates the general developmental differences
between minors and adults).
59. Id at 569-70; Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 438-39, 454 n.38 (1990) (plurality
opinion); Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 38, at 6-10.
60. Brief for U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops & Roman Catholic Bishop of Manchester as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320
(2006) (No. 04-1144) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005). See also Laurence
Steinberg et al., Are Adolescents Less Mature Than Adults? Minors' Access to Abortion, the Juvenile
Death Penalty, and the AllegedAPA "Flip Flop ", 64 AM. PSYCHOL. 583, 584 (2009) (discussing how in
Ayotte, opponents of adolescents' autonomous abortion rights had used research to argue that youths
were more likely to be more susceptible to outside influences compared to adults).
61. Cf Steinberg et al., supra note 60, at 586 ("In general ... when contemplating an abortion, an
adolescent has time to deliberate before making a final choice and has an opportunity to consult with an
expert," whereas decisions before criminal offenses by adolescents are "characterized by heightened
emotional arousal, time pressure, and peer influence.").
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The American Psychological Association submitted amici curiae briefs in
both Hodgson v. Minnesota (1990)62 and Roper v. Simmons (2005).63 In the first
case, which concerned a minor's right to get an abortion without involving her
parents, the APA compiled evidence in support of minors' competence and mature
decision-making skills.6" In contrast, in the juvenile death penalty case, the APA
argued that youth should be a mitigating factor in regards to legal responsibility for
a crime due to minors' developmental immaturity.65 The APA was accused of "flip-
flopping," or "trying to have their scientific cake and eat it too." 66 However, by
taking a closer look at the kinds of decisions relevant to each case, it becomes
apparent that it is entirely possible that adolescents are mature enough to make
informed decisions about their own health care while still being too immature to be
completely responsible for controlling their impulsive behavior.
A popular theory in developmental neuropsychology is that an adolescent's
tendency for risk-taking is due to psychosocial immaturity that influences their
ability to self-regulate. 67 Psychosocial immaturity refers to adolescents' ability to
coordinate their emotions, social interactions, and decisions. 68 So, while most
adolescents understand the consequences of their actions and have cognitive
abilities that are similar to those of an adult, in certain situations they have a harder
time using this knowledge and controlling their impulses. 69 When there is an
opportunity for juveniles to engage in risky behavior, the benefits, including peer
approval and a neurochemically driven feeling of pleasure, 70 often outweigh the
costs that seem more distant and unimportant.7'
62. See generally Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 38.
63. See generally Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n, supra
note 54.
64. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n, supra note 38, at 8-10.
65. Brief for American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n, supra note 54, at 13-
14.
66. See Steinberg et al., supra note 60, at 584-85.
67. See Laurence Steinberg, Risk Taking in Adolescence: What Changes, and Why?, 1021 ANNALS
N.Y. ACAD. ScL 51, 54 (2004) (noting that adolescents' prolonged development in the ability to self-
regulate contributes to increased risk-taking).
68. See Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM.
PSYCHOL. 1009, 1012 (2003).
69. See id; Steinberg, supra 67, at 52-54
70. See Matthew J. Fuxjager et al., Winning Territorial Disputes Selectively Enhances Androgen
Sensitivity in Neural Pathways Related to Motivation and Social Aggression, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
Sci. 12393, 12396 (2010). In this study, researchers demonstrate that winning aggressive encounters
increases activity in the nucleus accumbens, an area of the brain that mediates motivation and feelings of
reward. Id. This helps explain why winning aggressive encounters can enhance the desire to seek out
additional aggressive encounters. Id. In other words, the nucleus accumbens is involved in motivating
and reinforcing this pattern of behavior. Id.
71. See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 55 (noting that adolescents have difficulty comprehending the
future consequences of their actions and are more oriented to the present than the future).
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One of the central arguments made by the APA in its amicus brief to the
Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons is that "neuropsychological research
demonstrates that the adolescent brain has not reached adult maturity." 72 This
argument is supported by consistent evidence from several studies of brain
structure and function, all demonstrating prolonged development of the structure
and function of the prefrontal cortex.73 In arguing against executing juvenile
offenders, the APA focused on the gradual maturation of the frontal lobes, which
are known to be critical to "foresight, strategic thinking, and risk management." 74 If
the adolescent brain, particularly the regions known to be involved in foresight and
impulse control, has not yet reached the structural and functional maturity of the
average adult, it is logical to hold adolescents less responsible for their bad
decisions.75 This is especially true in cases involving criminal behavior, where the
neuroscience findings above agree nicely with existing behavioral studies.76 In their
brief to the Court, the APA offered ample evidence of "heightened risk-taking and
even criminal conduct which are moderated or eliminated by the individual in
adulthood." 77 It is also the case that the prevalence and incidence of crime peaks
during adolescence.78 Finally, studies indicate that it is statistically normative for
adolescents to participate in illegal activity.7 9 In other words, it is absolutely normal
for adolescents to take risks or make impulsive decisions that amount to or result in
some sort of criminal behavior. Stealing, speeding, and accepting a drink at a party
are all examples of common impulsive and illegal behavior.80 Most of this behavior
decreases or stops completely during adulthood."' Adolescent immaturity in this
context is supported not only by neuroscience research but also by studies of
72. Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n & the Missouri Psychological Ass'n, supra note 54,
at 9.
73. See, e.g., Giedd et al., supra note 56, at 862-63 (reporting a study of 145 children and
adolescents scanned up to five times over approximately ten years and explaining the many changes the
adolescent brain undergoes until reaching full development); see also Gogtay et al., supra note 56, at
8176-77 (noting the stages of brain maturity); Sowell et al., supra note 56, at 8821 (revealing the
finding that there is "a dramatic increase in local gray matter density loss in the frontal lobes" between
adolescence and adulthood).
74. Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n & Missouri Psychological Ass'n, supra note 54, at
10.
75. Id at 2.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id. at 5.
78. See id. at 6 (revealing that crime among juveniles increases gradually until the age of eighteen).
79. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 68, at 1012-13 (noting that research supports the notion that
adolescents engage in more risk-taking than adults which contributes to youth choice to engage in
criminal behavior).
80. See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 53 (noting that criminal behavior and drinking are risk taking
activities).
81. See Steinberg & Scott, supra note 68, at 1012 (noting that adolescents differ from adults in their
assessment of and attitude toward risk).
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behavior that are consistent with the findings about the brain. This sort of
behavioral neuroscience is directly relevant to the Roper v. Simmons verdict. 82
The differences between adolescent decision making in committing a crime
and making health care decisions is clear when comparing the mental processes of
the two choices. Throwing a bottle out from a moving car and breaking a
neighbor's windshield; succumbing to peer pressure to get drunk at a party; giving
in to your date and having unprotected sex; these are all examples of impulsive
decisions.83 These involve rash, highly impulsive actions. 84 They also involve
intense peer influence and lack of information from other sources.85 In these
situations, teens are forced to make quick decisions and are driven by a
physiological system that rewards them for risky behavior. 86 Deciding to get an
abortion two weeks after you realize that having sex has resulted in an unintended
pregnancy is not an impulsive decision,87 and it differs enormously from the first
three examples. There is no social or neurochemical reward following an
abortion.88 Setting up appointments, listening to the mandated counseling, and
waiting the often mandatory period of time between visiting a clinic and getting the
procedure all lead to a decision that takes time and in doing so eliminates the
possibility of impulsive decision making.89
In addition, when the behavior of juvenile girls is examined, it is clear that
their ability to make competent decisions about health care does not differ
significantly from that of women over eighteen. 90 For example, when women are
asked to consider their options in actual treatment settings at the time of their
82. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
83. See Steinberg, supra note 67, at 53.
84. See id (noting the prevalence of risky or potentially risky situations that adolescents often
encounter in the real world); see also Steinberg et al., supra note 60, at 586.
85. Steinberg et al., supra note 61, at 586, 592. See also Tom Luster & Stephen A. Small, Factors
Associated with Sexual Risk-Taking Behaviors Among Adolescents, 56 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 622, 623
(1994) (discussing the effect of lack of knowledge about sex and contraception on increased sexual risk
taking behaviors among adolescents); Steinberg, supra note 67, at 56 (explaining how adolescent
criminal behavior and under-age drinking is more likely to occur in groups).
86. Steinberg, supra note 67, at 53 (noting that the emotional backdrop for adolescent risk taking is
euphoria).
87. Steinberg et al., supra note 60, at 586.
88. Cf id. (differentiating abortion from other "typical adolescent criminal offense" based on the
characterized emotional arousal).
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Catherine C. Lewis, A Comparison of Minors' and Adults' Pregnancy Decisions, 50
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 446, 451 (1980) (noting that in one study a sample of minors seeking
pregnancy tests did "not differ from adults in their knowledge of the legality and confidentiality of
abortion"); see also Bruce Ambuel & Julian Rappaport, Developmental Trends in Adolescents'
Psychological and Legal Competence to Consent to Abortion, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 150 (1992)
("[M]ost minors are as competent as legal adults to make treatment decisions with respect to abortion . .
. ."); Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B. Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make
Informed Treatment Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589, 1595 (1982) (finding that fourteen-year-olds had
equal competency levels as adults in certain situations).
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pregnancy tests, unmarried minors ages thirteen to seventeen respond similarly to
unmarried women ages eighteen to twenty-five on their knowledge of pregnancy
related laws, their decision to follow through with the pregnancy, and the
consequences and considerations that could affect their choice. 91 Further, the
responses of minors did not differ significantly from adults on additional elements
such as positive emotions associated with mothering, financial concerns, social
stigma, and future goals.92
The act of having sex at fifteen may be impulsive (or coerced) but the rash
decisions end here. Decisions about reproductive health are anything but
impulsive.93 Obtaining and consistently using birth control, being fitted for a
diaphragm, as well as terminating an unwanted pregnancy all require a young
woman to "sit" with her decision for a period of days or even weeks.94 Given the
enormity and complexity of the processes that a juvenile must endure in order to
obtain safe reproductive care, impulsivity is simply impossible. As the next section
discusses, it is critical to keep in mind that once a girl has gone through puberty not
only is she capable of reproduction, but puberty also forever changes the structure
and function of her brain.
IV. THE RELEVANCE OF SEX DIFFERENCES
Prior to the onset of puberty, girls and boys are likely to have more
differences in behavior within their own sex than between the two sexes.95 While
there are certainly some young children who engage in more intense gendered
behavior than others, there are plenty who are fine to sit somewhere in the middle. 96
When the biology of puberty begins, the differences between boys and girls are
intentionally (from an evolutionary standpoint) exaggerated to encourage mating
91. See Lewis, supra note 90, at 447, 452.
92. Id at 449. In this study, 25% of minors and 35% of adults said that mothering concerns affected
their choice of abortion. In addition, 44% of minors and 38% of adults said that financial concerns
affected their decision. Likewise, 44% of minors and 54% of adults considered the effect an abortion
would have on life-goals while 19% of minors and 12% of adults considered the social stigma of their
decision. Id.
93. See Steinberg et al., supra note 60, at 586.
94. Id. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6709 (2002 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS §
333.17015(3) (West 2008) (requiring a doctor to wait at least twenty-four hours after first meeting with
the patient before performing the abortion).
95. See Valerie E. Whiffen & Natasha Demidenko, Mood Disturbance Across the Life Span, in
HANDBOOK OF GIRLS' AND WOMEN'S PSYCHOLOGICAL HEALTH 51, 52 (Judith Worell & Carol D.
Goodheart eds., 2006) (finding that the "gender gap first emerges in early adolescence"); cf A. Angold
et al., Puberty and Depression: The Roles ofAge, Pubertal Status and Pubertal Timing, 28 PSYCHOL.
MED. 51, 55 (1998) (finding that at or above the age of thirteen, girls had consistently higher rates of
depression than boys, which was relatively similar at earlier ages).
96. See Janet Shibley Hyde, The Gender Similarities Hypothesis, 60 AM. PSYCHOL. 581, 586
(2005) ("[M]en and women, as well as boys and girls, are more alike than they are different.").
26 [VOt. 15:15
JUVENILE NEUROLAW
and reproduction. 97 In present times, however, these biological changes take place
in a socio-cultural context that exerts a great deal of influence on both the brain and
behavior of the emerging adolescent. 98 Puberty is the biological event, and
adolescence is the socio-cultural expression of this biological event.99 As such, in
order to appreciate the biology, one must consider the context. Much in the same
way we learn the language we are exposed to at birth, we learn the social rules of
adulthood through our experience during adolescence. 100
The hormonal changes that females experience during puberty produce
discernable neurological maturation.101 The two most widely noted neurological
changes are, relative to boys, accelerated maturation of the hippocampus and the
prefrontal cortex.102 These structures are critical for thinking, memory and
planning. 0 3 Practically, this means that once they have reached puberty, females
are much more likely to have a biological "leg up" (relative to their male
counterparts) when it comes to reasoning, planning, and complex decision
making.104 Adolescent females consistently perform better than same-age males on
tasks that require them to foresee potential consequence of their actions. 0 5 From an
evolutionary standpoint, this sex difference in the timing of brain development
makes sense: the cognitive and social skills required to successfully give birth and
97. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE DESCENT OF MAN AND SELECTION IN RELATION TO SEX
(1872) (hypothesizing that sex differences, which emerge during puberty, can be explained by the need
to recognize the opposite sex, and in doing so enables competition within a species for mates and
furthers the process of natural selection).
98. Avshalom Caspi et al., Unraveling Girls' Delinquency: Biological, Dispositional, and
Contextual Contributions to Adolescent Misbehavior, 29 DEV. PSYCHOL. 19, 20 (1993).
99. Abigail A. Baird, The Terrible Twelves, in DEVELOPMENTAL SOCIAL COGNITIVE
NEUROSCIENCE 191, 192 (Philip D. Zelazo et al. eds., 2010). See also Ronald E. Dahl, Adolescent Brain
Development: A Period of Vulnerabilities and Opportunities, 1021 ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SC. 1, 9-10
(2004) (explaining that puberty is the process by which males and females undergo physical maturation
whereas adolescence is the time period by which adolescents grow and mature into their societal roles).
100. Baird, supra note, 99, at 194; Dahl, supra note 99, at 10.
101. See Whiffen & Demidenko, supra note 95, at 52.
102. Baird, supra note 99, at 195-96. Giedd et al., supra note 56, at 863.
103. See Baird, supra note 99at 197; see also FRANCESCO P. BATTAGLIA ET AL., SPATIAL DECISIONS
AND NEURONAL ACTIVITY IN HIPPOCAMPAL PROJECTION ZONES IN PREFONTRAL CORTEX AND
STRIATUM, IN HIPPOCAMPAL PLACE FIELDS: RELEVANCE TO LEARNING AND MEMORY 289, 290 (Sheri
J. Y. Mizumori ed., 2008) (discussing how the hippocampal system is responsible for "process[ing] a
large amount of relational information, and reconstruct[ing] previous episodes that may be relevant for
shaping the decision at hand").
104. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 99, at 196, 198 (finding that density of gray matter of both frontal
and parietal lobes peaks at an earlier point for girls than for boys, and that the decline of gray matter in
prefrontal cortex in adolescence has been taken to be a marker of neural maturation); Giedd et al., supra
note 56, at 863 (finding that the frontal and parietal gray matter reaches its highest point about one year
earlier in girls than boys).
105. Laurence Steinberg et al., Age Differences in Future Orientation and Delay Discounting, 80
CHILD DEV. 28, 36 (2009) (finding that females performed better than males in planning ahead, time
perspective, and anticipation of future consequences).
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raise a child ideally "takes a village,""o6 but it can be done by a single young
woman with a brain that has undergone the hormonal transformation of puberty and
learned from the experience of adolescence. 0 7 This argument also supports the idea
that a young woman who has undergone puberty (a pre-requisite to pregnancy) is
capable of making a mature and autonomous decision about her own body.'0 8 This
does not preclude the need to consider each individual's circumstance, nor does it
suggest that a young woman making such a decision would not benefit from
counseling and social support.109
Differences in adolescent behavior as a function of gender are also a critical
differentiator of the death penalty versus reproductive rights argument.
Underscoring the baseless use of the Roper v. Simmons verdict in any proceeding
about a juvenile female's right to make her own health care decisions is the simple
fact that no juvenile male has ever become pregnant. For example, in order to
justify restricting a juvenile female's right to abortion, the Supreme Court has clung
to "the peculiar vulnerability of children" it established in Belloti v. Baird.'io
However, when it comes to adolescent girls' ability to make mature health care
decisions, this claim is undeniably refuted by both behavioral and neuroscientific
evidence.'''
106. See, e.g., Deborah Koniak-Griffin & Carmen Turner-Pluta, Health Risks and Psychosocial
Outcomes of Early Childbearing: A Review of the Literature, J. PERINATAL & NEONATAL NURSING,
Sept. 2001, at 1, 3, 5 (discussing how juveniles who raise children at a young age often lack the
resources and social support to raise children which results in increased health risks and economic
problems for both); see generally HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER
LESSONS CHILDREN TEACH Us 7 (1996) (describing the intense amount of social, emotional and
economic support that children need to develop optimally).
107. See generally Ann S. Masten, Resilience in Individual Development: Successful Adaptation
Despite Risk and Adversity, in EDUCATIONAL RESILIENCE IN INNER-CITY AMERICA: CHALLENGES AND
PROSPECTS 3, 11 (Margaret C. Wang & Edmund W. Gordon et al. eds., 1994); LOUANN BRIZENDINE,
THE FEMALE BRAIN 34, 35 (2006) (noting that female hormonal changes that take place during puberty
serve to increase critical thinking, develop emotional responsivity, and help the female to deal with
stress).
108. See id. at 34 (discussing how going through puberty strengthens females critical thinking and
emotional responsiveness).
109. See Daniel Bluestein & M. Elizabeth Starling, Helping Pregnant Teenagers, 161 W. J. MED.
140, 142 (1994) (noting that both appropriate health care, as well as consultation between the doctor and
pregnant teen, can lead to informed decisions regarding the teen's pregnancy).
I 10. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 US 622, 634 (1979) (Baird I). This is a "peculiar" stance given that in the
United States an average of fourteen in 100,000 women die every year from pregnancy and childbirth
related events, while an average of.7 women in every 100,000 die from events related to the termination
of pregnancy. See Margaret C. Hogan et al., Maternal Morality for 181 Countries, 1980-2008: A
Systematic Analysis of Progress Towards Millennium Development Goal 5, 375 LANCET 1609, 1617
(2010); Linda Bartlett et al., Risk Factors for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United
States, 103 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 733 (2004).
111. See supra text accompanying notes 10 1-09.
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V. NEUROLAW: "THE GIRL WITH THE CURL"
There was a little girl,
And she had a little curl
Right in the middle of her forehead.
When she was good,
She was very, very good,
And when she was bad she was horrid.112
The behavioral and neuroscientific evidence presented in the previous section
convincingly demonstrate that juvenile females are capable of making autonomous
decisions about their reproductive health care. However, this conclusion is not
without a caveat or two. Although neuroscience may be "very good" for developing
law and policy, if evidence from neuroscience is not used carefully, its use can be
"horrid." Like all scientific information, neuroscientific evidence is at risk for
misinterpretation and over-extrapolation.1 3 It is of paramount importance that
professionals, such as policy-makers, lawyers, judges, and advocates, be
responsible and accurate with emerging findings from neuroscience in order to
ensure their principled use.1 4 Scientists have also warned that policy-makers must
always be cautious when using science to direct policy, as policy in theory is meant
to last a set period of time and have far-reaching power, while science has a more
narrowed focus and is perpetually open to change." 5
Scientific findings are reported in terms of probabilities, which inherently
leave room for exception, and this does not sit well with the law." 6 At this point in
time, well-replicated behavioral findings should command equal and at times even
greater attention from the court than often-conflicting neuroscientific accounts.
Neurological data certainly has its limitations.' '1 One cannot ignore individual
differences, specific context, or the idiosyncratic mix of the two." 8 No two people
are alike, and while data from imaging studies may show trends in structural
maturity (e.g. what a teenage boy or girl's brain should look like on average)
112. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, THERE WAS A LITTLE GIRL, in THE WORLD'S BEST
POETRY 169 (Bliss Carman ed., 1904).
113. Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 216-17 (2009).
114. See id. at 216 (noting that "[dlespite the lack of empirical evidence," there has been heavy
emphasis on adolescent brain research in shaping "health-and-welfare policy").
115. See Brent Garland & Mark S. Frankel, Considering Convergence: A Policy Dialogue About
Behavioral Genetics, Neuroscience, and Law, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2006, at 101,
I10-11 (describing that once policy changes have been implemented they can be very difficult to
reform, whereas science is constantly changing).
116. See Maroney, supra note 16, at 148, 149. That said, if individuals knew there was a ninety-five
percent chance of being eaten by a shark, few would go into the water believing that they would be the
five percent who survive.
117. See, e.g., id at 146 (identifying developmental neuroscience biggest limitation as its incapability
of assessing people on an individual basis).
118. See id. (discussing how all humans differ in their rates of "structural maturation").
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people develop at different speeds, depending on genetics and environmental
influences."l 9 If the environment demands that an individual mature quickly (for
example, a juvenile with an ailing mother and younger siblings may need to work
in order to support the family), the frontal lobe will likely be much more developed
at age sixteen than the that of a typical high school student in an American middle
class family.120 Vanderbilt University Associate Professor of Law Terry Maroney
succinctly argues:
[S]uch variation cannot be detected or interpreted in any legally
meaningful way. Neither structural nor functional imaging can
determine whether any given individual has a "mature brain" in any
respect, though imaging might reveal gross pathology. Researchers
therefore consistently agree that developmental neuroscience cannot
at present generate reliable predictions or findings about an
individual's behavioral maturity. Courts thus have a strong basis for
deeming brain science irrelevant to many highly individualized
claims, such as whether a defendant was able to form specific
intent.121
Maroney points out an undeniable shortcoming, as well as the most common
(at present) and blatant misuse of what neuroscience has to offer. 122 When used
appropriately and accurately, the information derived from empirical studies
provides vital insight into human cognition, reasoning, and behavior. Science can
inform policy without being the principle factor in determining guilt or sentencing
in a criminal setting. More specifically, neuroscientific data has been, and can
continue to, inform decisions in both the legal and public policy realms.1 23
However, in order to do so, data derived from developmental neuroscience must be
used in a highly principled manner. Not doing so most assuredly creates the
possibility that neuroscience may someday be considered irrelevant to legal
matters.124 For example, the overuse of poorly understood "science" led Virginia to
declare all testimony about a defendant's state of mind inadmissible.125
119. Id.
120. See id. at 163-64 (describing how emotional experiences, or lack thereof, are linked to the
maturation process).
121. Id at 146.
122. Id. at 145 (explaining the misuse of neuroscience by the courts).
123. Id. at 167.
124. See Johnson et al., supra note 113, at 219-20 (finding that neuroscience "has been used too
liberally to draw conclusions where there is little empirical basis for interpreting the results" and more
generally the "peril of leaving nonscientists to arbitrate and translate neuroscience for policy"); see
generally THE LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE PROJECT, A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE: A CONCISE
INTRODUCTION 54-71 (Andrew S. Mansfield ed., 2010) (providing an overview of existing, near future,
and long run impact of neuroscience and the law).
125. Garland & Frankel, supra note 115, at 111 n.47 (stating that Virginia has held testimony
regarding a defendant's mental state is barred unless the defendant is asserting the insanity defense).
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Neuroscientists are aware that this could be the fate of brain-based evidence,
if all are not prudent about how and when such evidence is used.126 This is
particularly concerning as there is great promise for increasingly accurate and
comprehensive descriptions of human development. Professor Maroney reminds us
that currently one of the critical contributions developmental neuroscience has to
offer is a buttressing and reaffirmation of traditional juvenile justice values.127
These values come not simply from understanding an individual's neurophysiology
but from integrating what we know about the individual with a better understanding
of the social and legal contexts created for juveniles more generally.128 As long as
we have legal regimes for adolescents that differ from those for adults, they should
be informed by the best of what we know the differences between adolescents and
adults to be; and the more information amassed, the better our understanding will
be. In order to construct more rational legal regimes with regard to juveniles,
insights from developmental neuroscience must be considered.
In moving forward it is judicious to proceed with awareness that the
disciplines of Law and Neuroscience are still becoming fluent in each other's
language.129 Through a better mutual understanding of what developmental
neuroscience can (and as importantly, cannot) offer the Court, as well as a better
appreciation for how legal decisions (e.g., sentencing and access to health care)
impact the development of the adolescent, a relationship can develop that will
enable both Neuroscience and Law to make increasingly informed decisions that
are in the best interests of both the individual and society at large.130
Perhaps the largest obstacle preventing a fluent conversation between
Neuroscience and Law is what Garland and Frankel call "cultural differences"
between Law and the sciences.' 3' Simply, science is problem-focused; scientific
inquiry produces data and hypotheses that are to be questioned, re-examined, and
contested as part of an ongoing dialogue or process within the scientific
community.132 In taking this approach, scientific investigators acknowledge the
likelihood of revision, remodeling and sometimes complete rebuking of their
126. Id. See generally Rosen, supra note 14 (highlighting the arguments of both supporters and
opponents of the use of neuroscience in the courts).
127. Maroney, supra note 16, at 167, 175.
128. Id at 175.
129. Maroney, supra note 16, at 175.
130. See Garland & Frankel, supra note 115, at 111-13 (proposing an excellent model for a non-
governmental advisory body containing members of the legal, scientific, and criminal justice professions
assist to policymakers).
131. Id. at 110.
132. Id. ("Science has a narrowing, problem-focused method, and its discoveries are seen as part of a
continuing dialogue, open to change in light of new information.").
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findings.133 Science is a slow, iterative process that places convergence from many
difference sources and replicability at its heart. 134
This culture is at odds with the needs and methods of the legal system. Law
works on a case-by-case basis at an extremely rapid pace (as often people's lives
hang in the balance while decisions are being made), and it uses the best tools
available in the moment they are needed to solve the matter at hand.' 35 Often as a
result of this cultural difference, scientific data-including neurological data-is
misinterpreted or overextended.' 36 Legislatures, courts, and advocates may take
results from neuroscientific studies and bend them to "fit" their cause.
Neuroscience data is not a "silver bullet" or "absolute truth" within any legal or
public policy context.13
Ultimately, the context in which neuroscience is used (or not) is critical. For
example, behavioral and neuroscientific research have amply demonstrated for
decades that most people under the age of eighteen have some difficulty with
impulse control, particularly under the influence of their peers.' 3 8 It is hard to find
exceptions to these findings. 139 This is not the case with juveniles' decisions that
take place in reflective, structured contexts like medical decision making, and more
specifically decisions concerning reproductive health. 140 Given this, it is clear that
within certain settings behavioral neuroscience is an appropriate source of
information for making legal decisions or setting public policies detailed
previously. Developmental neuroscience provides compelling evidence that most
juvenile females are mature enough to make sound autonomous decisions about
their health.14' Yet, neuroscience alone cannot set a chronological age by which
adult-like reasoning is guaranteed nor determine the specific maturational status of
133. Id. atl 10-11.
134. Id. atl 10-11 (noting that scientific "knowledge [is] slowly built up . . . [and] values consensus
and replicability").
135. Id. at 111 ("Lawyers and judges, on the other hand, often operate with little knowledge of
science and the scientific method and work on a more pressing timeline to solve the problems
immediately before them. Law moves forwards on advocacy-using the tools available at the time the
conflict must be addressed.").
136. Cf id. at 109-10 (providing examples of how bad science made bad law and policy in the past).
137. See Maroney, supra note 16, at 166-67 (relating the real but limited usefulness of
neuroscience).
138. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text; see also Abigail A. Baird, The Developmental
Neuroscience of Criminal Behavior, in THE IMPACT OF BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES ON CRIMINAL LAW 81,
110-12 (Nita A. Farahany ed., 2009) (reviewing the literature on teenage neurological development).
140. See supra note 93-94 and accompanying text. Health decisions about abortions are defined as
"medical" in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. I13, 166 (1973) ("Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision . . .
141. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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a particular individual.142 What it can do is contribute a number of critical factors
for consideration when determining the legal rights of juveniles.143
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The role of neuroscience in the courtroom is rather controversial, and
understandably so. Scientific discoveries can be interpreted and implemented in
very different ways, and as such science has provided one of the best and one of the
worst contributions to the courts, both stemming from the same area of research:
genetics. For example, the discovery and implementation of DNA profiling (also
known as DNA testing or forensic DNA) has been an extremely useful addition to
the court process as a valuable (and influential) piece of evidence.144 DNA samples
from both the crime scene and the suspect are taken, analyzed, and compared to
determine if they are the same.145 Before DNA profiling was widely used
throughout criminal investigations, many innocent men and women were falsely
found guilty,146 and vice-versa.147 This data can even save lives, as there have been
cases of individuals on death row being proven innocent after DNA tests became a
142. See supra notes 109, 117-20 and accompany text.
143. See Maroney, supra note 16, at 166-67 (relating the real but limited usefulness of neuroscience
for public policy).
144. See Margaret A. Berger, The Impact of DNA Exonerations on the Criminal Justice System, 34
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 321 (2006) (listing reduced desirability of the death penalty, increased scrutiny
of forensic lab operations, and greater consideration for all forms of forensic science as three effects of
DNA profiling on the criminal justice system).
145. See id at 322; see generally About Forensic DNA, DNA INITIATIVE, http://www.dna.gov/basics
(last visited Feb. 9, 2012) (providing an in-depth review of the tools, law, and issues of DNA evidence
in America).
146. As of September 2011, 273 individuals have received post-conviction DNA exonerations in the
United States. Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts-on PostConviction DNA Exonerations.php (last
visited Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations]. See, e.g., Fernanda
Santos, DNA Testing Frees Man Imprisoned for Half His Life, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at BI
(profiling one prisoner who was exonerated by DNA evidence).
147. Out of 273 post-conviction DNA exoncrations, the true suspect was identified in 124 cases.
Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 146. See, e.g., What Every Law Enforcement
Officer Should Know About DNA Evidence, DNA INITIATIVE,
http://www.dna.gov/audiences/investigators/know (last visited Feb. 9, 2012). The DNA Initiative
provides:
In 1996, Gerald Parker-then in a California prison on a parole violation stemming
from a 1980 sentence for raping a child-was charged with the rapes and murders of
five women between December 1978 and October 1979 and the murder of a fetus
during a rape in 1980. DNA samples from the crime scenes were run through
California's sexual assault/violent offenders database, and four of the cases were found
to have been committed by the same perpetrator. After DNA tests linked Parker to the
victims, he confessed to the crimes. He also confessed to a similar, fifth crime for which
Kevin Lee Green had been wrongly convicted and had served sixteen years in prison.
Id
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normal part of criminal investigations.1 48 The data that DNA profiling provides is
invaluable, as it presents much more concrete and compelling evidence for criminal
cases, and in this way science is extremely beneficial to the court.149 The
acceptance of DNA as evidence in the courtroom has taken a number of years, and
undergone repeated and rigorous scrutiny,o50 making it a good use of science-
"very good" indeed.' 5'
Conversely, the "horrid" practice of eugenics was a scientific contribution
stemming from genetic research in the 1920's and 1930's that led to the misguided
decision in Buck v. BeI' 52 to involuntarily sterilize the "feeble minded," in order to
prevent future generations of criminals and "imbeciles." 53 This decision was
upheld by the Supreme Court, with Justice Holmes commenting that:
It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind.
The principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to
cover cutting the Fallopian tubes.154
Fortunately, in more recent times such arcane practices have been dispensed
with; 55 however, history serves as an important reminder of the mindfulness with
which we must proceed when incorporating science into our legal policies.
Currently, neuroscience is at the same point genetics was once at, and at
present seems to be following more in the footsteps of DNA profiling rather than
eugenics. If used properly and interpreted accurately, neuroscientific data could aid
the courts just as much as data from DNA methodologies have. However, if
professionals misuse, grossly misinterpret or "stretch" the meaning of the data,
neuroscience will end up sharing its history with eugenics.156 This is precisely the
148. Out the 273 people exonerated through DNA, seventeen had been on death row. Facts on Post-
Conviction DNA Exonerations, supra note 146. For example, Louisiana resident Ryan Matthews was
falsely sentenced to the death penalty for murder in 1999, but in 2004 was given a new trial based on
DNA evidence. Ryan Matthews: Juvenile Offender in Louisiana, THE INT'L JUSTICE PROJECT,
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/juvRMatthews.cfm (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).
149. See Berger, supra note 144, at 322 (noting the common use of DNA testing and general
consensus on its remarkable value to forensics).
150. Congress did not give all federal inmates the right for post-conviction DNA testing until 2004.
Justice For All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108405, 118 Stat. 2260 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (2006). Title IV of the Justice for All Act is the Innocence
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2278 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2006)). See also
Berger supra note 144, at 321.
151. LONGFELLOW, supra note 113.
152. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
153. Garland & Frankel, supra note 115, at I10.
154. Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
155. See Paul A. Lombardo, Taking Eugenics Seriously: Three Generations of??? Are Enough?, 30
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 191, 202 (2003) (stating that the history of eugenics in 191h century America finally
concluded in 1979 in Virginia).
156. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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danger of misusing neuroscientific references in rulings on criminal matters to try
to further restrict the civil rights (especially those involving reproductive health
care) of juveniles. While much scientific ground remains to be covered,
neuroscience is able to meaningfully inform the court in ways that could benefit,
and possibly even save, many lives. 57 It is for this, and many other reasons, that
the conversation between Law and Neuroscience must continue, as the potential
fruits of this labor are too important to both individuals and society to ignore.
157. See supra note 148 and accompanying text (describing the lives that have been saved by the
evolution of DNA technology); see also Maroney, supra note 16, at 149 (discussing the positive aspects
of developmental psychology and neuroscience).
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